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Abstract—We present a game-theoretic analysis of the in-
teraction between a malicious node, attempting to perform
unauthorized radio transmission, and friendly jammers trying
to disrupt the malicious communications. We investigate the
strategic behavior of the jammers against a rational malicious
node and highlight counterintuitive results for this conflict. We
also analyze the impact of multiple friendly jammers sharing the
same goal but acting without coordination; we find out that this
scenario offers a better payoff for the jammers, which has some
strong implications on how to implement friendly jamming.
Index Terms—Friendly jamming; network security; wireless
LAN; game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
FREQUENCY jamming, usually performed to disruptwireless communications, can also be used for good,
namely to block unauthenticated transmissions, such as injec-
tion attacks; this is often referred to as friendly jamming [1].
We analyze the scenario of a local wireless network, e.g., in a
campus or a public premise, challenged by a malicious node,
whose activity can jeopardize network operation or whose
radio access is forbidden: think of a student communicating to
cheat during exams. To block it, the network dispatches one
or more friendly jammers that reactively look for forbidden
frames and jam their payloads [2]. The effectiveness of the
friendly jammers depends on many aspects, such as their
ability to monitor the channel, frequency hopping patterns,
synchronization issues, and so on [3]. They also have multiple
ways to disrupt unauthorized communications, e.g., jamming
data packets or interfere with the reception of acknowledg-
ments [4]. We abstract from all these elements and just
consider an average success / failure rate of the jamming.
We frame the resulting conflict as an Entry game, a setup
often used in economic scenarios, e.g., the telecommunication
market [5]. Our goal is to infer results for effective security
techniques, and prompt for extensions in practical contexts.
First, we derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the en-
try game in closed form. One unexpected conclusion involves
the dependences on the transmission cost, assumed identical
for the jammer and the malicious node, and the reward that
the latter gets for a successful attack. The frequency of attacks
is proportional to the transmission cost, while the jamming
probability decreases with it. Conversely, a higher reward
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leads to lower attack and higher jamming probabilities. These
exploits stem from the strategic behavior of the players and
will be discussed and justified. It is also noted that the jammer
obtains a strictly negative average payoff.
Moreover, we consider two friendly jammers with the same
purpose of defeating the attacker but also being strategic and
uncoordinated, i.e., each may prefer to save the transmission
cost and let the unwarranted transmissions be jammed by the
other [6]. We derive the Nash equilibrium in closed form,
with the interesting twist that the transmission cost term is
now replaced by the square root of the transmission cost times
the reward for a successful attack. As a result, the probability
of malicious transmissions is increased, while the jamming
probability is decreased. In addition, while the previous sce-
nario was not strategically sustainable for the jammers due to
a negative payoff, the one with multiple jammers might be, as
long as the transmission cost is limited (as a rule of thumb:
at most 20% of the reward for a successful jamming).
II. RELATED WORK
A long-standing branch of research focuses on friendly
jamming, mostly aimed at its implementation. For instance,
[2] analyzed friendly jamming in wireless LANs, and [3]
demonstrated the ease of implementation of friendly jamming
with off-the-shelf smartphones. A proper signal design may be
used to scramble only malicious transmissions but be harmless
against legitimate ones [7]. In our scenario, jammers interact
with the malicious node only; hence, we assume that they
just increase the noise floor to lower channel capacity [8]. We
do not deal with implementation details, nor we distinguish
between different kinds of jamming, as exhaustively done in
[4]; these are possible extensions for future work.
Other contributions [1], [9], [10] use game theory to study
jamming problems, since they involve multiple players (usu-
ally limited in number) with different objectives and acting
without coordination, and it is relatively easy to quantify the
outcomes [9]. This last paper also offers a detailed discussion
on how to evaluate game theoretic payoffs related to the quality
of service of the network under jamming, so the reader is
referred to it as a complement of our analysis in this sense.
Other studies [1] consider incentives for the jammers to
contribute to network security against eavesdropping, e.g., as
a bargain between the network and volunteering friendly jam-
mers. The network negotiates incentives to support information
secrecy and defeat the eavesdroppers [10]. Thus, jammers
benefit from contributing to security purely based on their own
utility. Yet, in these studies the malicious node is not strategic
and does not react to the strategic jammers.
TABLE I
MAIN SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Parameter Symbol
Transmission cost for all nodes c
Reward for successful malicious transmission r
Failure probability of jamming action f
Benefit for successful jamming action set to 1
Instead, we consider the malicious node as a concerned
third party, i.e., a strategic player that makes decisions as best
responses [8]. Another difference with the literature is that we
also consider multiple uncoordinated jammers. This is akin
to [6], where many agents acting toward a common goal, but
without coordination and driven by strategic interests, were
shown to suffer a limited efficiency loss; yet, this may no
longer hold when their task involves a strategic adversary. All
these differences justify our novel analysis.
III. GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS, ONE JAMMER
Consider a complete information game between a network
agent N and a malicious node M. The latter wants to perform
unauthorized radio communications, whereas the former mon-
itors the channel looking for unwarranted transmissions, and
tries to prevent M’s from communicating and/or increase the
airtime for the legitimate nodes of an enterprise network. Thus,
N acts as a reactive friendly jammer [3], and it is sensible to
assume complete information, meaning that both players are
mutually aware of each other and their objectives.
We formulate a static (one-shot) game that concentrates
the strategic interplay in one interaction. In a static game,
players separately choose their only move, which avoids
synchronization issues [2]. A static game is generally the first
building block of more advanced formulations, such as multi-
ple interactions studied as repeated games [11]; however, this
requires a discussion on the activity/frequency hopping pattern
of the transmitter, and what does the jammer know about it.
Extensions through Bayesian games [6] would allow for play-
ers being uncertain of each other’s presence, or having multiple
objectives, such as transmitters being in a variable number
and/or performing both legitimate and malicious activity, or
jammers choosing between just disrupting communications or
detecting malicious nodes first [12]. All these studies are left
for future work beyond the present investigation.
The values in Table I, set as generic parameters, are
common knowledge among the players; one can follow [9]
for their exact quantification. We denote as c the cost spent
for transmitting, assumed identical for both players, as their
transmitters likely use a similar circuitry, e.g., a standard WiFi
card, possibly purposely programmed for jamming. We reckon
that N’s jamming may be unsuccessful; we abstract its average
failure rate with probability f . As argued before, f accounts
for all technical aspects related to jamming success or failure.
Also, we set a reward for node M, denoted as r, earned if
its malicious actions succeed. This value reflects the incentive
for M to transmit, despite being aware that it can be jammed,
in which case it will just pay cost c. Similarly, we consider
the returning utility for the friendly jammer, and we assume
that whenever M is successful and gains r, player N suffers
a loss of the same amount [8]. By contrast, the benefit for
TABLE II
NORMAL-FORM (PAYOFF MATRIX) OF GAME J1
Malicious node M
E O
Network agent N
J (1−f)− fr − c, fr − c −c, 0
A −r, r − c 0, 0
stopping the malicious actions of player M is in principle a
different quantity, which can even be the outcome of a game
theoretic bargain between the network administrator and the
friendly jammers [10]. Without loss of generality, and for the
sake of a simpler notation, we set this value to 1; changing it
would be equivalent to rescale all the other values.
The interaction between N and M is set as a static entry game
J1 of complete information [5]. This is a potential foundation
for extensions e.g., to Bayesian or dynamic games [6], [9],
which are left for future work. We assign two available actions
to both players, which allows for a closed form solution. The
malicious node M can enter (action denoted as E), that is, to
perform unwarranted transmission, or stay out (action O), i.e.,
to feign transmission but actually avoid it; this is the correct
action if M believes that the friendly jamming is active. In
practice, node M enacts a probabilistic mixture of these two
actions, which quantify its transmission probability. Similarly,
N can friendly jam (action J) or abstain from it, e.g., to save
energy (action A). The mixing of these actions results in the
jamming probability. This setup is akin to others in the field of
security: it is worth mentioning that the sole presence of the
legitimate player as a watchdog (even not taking any actual
countermeasure) may deter the malicious player from entering.
Players independently choose their strategies, which jointly
determine their payoffs: for strategy pair (n,m), player
X∈{N,M} gets uX(n,m). Table II shows the normal form of
J1. In more detail, whenever M stays out, its payoff is 0. If it
enters, its payoff has a −c term and depends on the jamming
outcome. If N is not jamming, then M gets a reward r. Since
N’s jamming fails with probability f , outcome (J,E) results in
N and M earning (1−f)−fr−c and fr−c, respectively. 1
Table II requires this sensibility condition: fr ≤ c ≤ r. If
either side is violated, M’s action is obvious, as E or O are
dominant strategies, respectively. It must also hold that
f ≤ 1 + r − c
1 + r
(1)
or jamming is too rarely successful and N always plays A.
Under these conditions, J1 has no pure strategy Nash
equilibria, thus it must exist an equilibrium in mixed strategies,
as per the Nash theorem [11], where N plays J with probability
j and A with probability 1−j, while M mediates between E
and O with probabilities ε and 1−ε, respectively.
Theorem 1: To derive j and ǫ in closed form, impose
E[uN(0, ε)]=E[uN(1, ε)] and E[uM(j, 0)]=E[uM(j, 1)].
Proof: This result follows the Indifference Principle [11],
which states that a player reaching a Nash equilibrium with a
mixture of strategies x1 and x2 with respective probabilities
1These outcomes are accessible to both players. Indeed, the network can
eavesdrop to the malicious transmission to see whether it was successful (e.g.,
acknowledgments are sent, or the packets sent progress forward).
ξ and 1−ξ, 0 < ξ < 1, achieves the same expected payoff by
playing x1 (or x2) alone, i.e., ξ = 0 (or ξ = 1), if all other
players do not change their strategies.
Hence, if M chooses transmission probability ε, N must have
the same expected payoff when playing either J or A, thus
(1−f−fr−c)ε−c(1−ε)= −rε ⇒ ε = c
(1+r)(1−f) . (2)
and similarly
j =
1− c/r
1− f , with j ≤ 1 due to (1). (3)
These results closely relate with the strategic behavior of the
players. If cost c increases, the malicious node becomes more
active, since it is more expensive for the jammer to counteract
the attacks, and this is common knowledge among the players.
Also, the impact of reward r may seem surprising: the larger r,
the lower the transmission probability ε and instead the higher
the jamming probability j. The explanation is that the mixed
strategy equilibrium sets indifference between the players’
alternatives. Knowing that r is large, N prefers to pay the
transmission cost and jam more often; thus, M’s transmission
probability decreases. Also, E[uM(j, ε)]=0 because of the
indifference with playing O, whereas for the jammer
E[uN(j, ε)]= jε(1+r)(1−f)− εr− jc = −cr
(1+r)(1−f) (4)
which is always negative; hence, N may arguably not find
it sustainable to partake in the game with the only incentive
being a benefit of +1 when M is successfully jammed.
IV. GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS, TWO JAMMERS
The analysis can be extended to multiple friendly jammers.
For tractability, we consider 2 jammers, but most of the
implications can be qualitatively extended to a higher number.
The game, now called J2, involves two friendly jammers N1
and N2, and malicious node M. As before, the available actions
are J and A for the jammers, E and O for the malicious
node. The jammers act with the same purpose of disrupting
transmissions from M, but are also strategic in that they prefer
to be inactive, and avoid paying the transmission cost, if the
other is already successfully jamming. The jammers have the
same transmission cost c, also identical to that of M, and the
same failure rate f . Actually, the latter may be questionable
as success of jamming is strongly dependent, for example, on
the positions of the nodes [2]. However, the value of f , which
is common knowledge, represents an average estimate rather
than the actual failure rate of a specific jamming instance.
Thus, for the problem at hand it is sensible to have the same
f for N1 and N2. Also, we assume they jam independently,
so when both jammers are active the overall failure rate is f2.
The payoffs for J2 can be extrapolated from J1 and the
normal form expands to three dimensions; for visualization
purposes, we split it in two according to the action of N1 and
only show N2’s and M’s payoffs; N1’s payoff is inferred by
symmetry considerations. If N1 plays A, the game falls back
to J1, as there is only one jammer (N2) that can contrast M.
Table III shows payoffs uN2(n1, n2,m) and uM(n1, n2,m).
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists, analogous to J1, but
with more involuted equations involving 3 players. To solve
TABLE III
PAYOFF MATRIX OF GAME J2 , ONLY PLAYERS N2 AND M.
if Network agent N1 plays J: Malicious node M
E O
Network agent N2
J (1−f2)−f2r − c, f2 r − c −c, 0
A (1−f)−fr, fr − c 0, 0
if Network agent N1 plays A:
same payoffs of N2 and M as per game J1 (Table II)
in closed form, we exploit symmetry and assume that both
jammers play J with the same probability j, while M transmits
with probability ε. We set indifference for M in the expected
payoffs E[uM] when playing E and O (the latter is 0), i.e.
j2(f2r−c) + 2j(1−j)(fr−c) + (1−j)2(r−c) = 0 (5)
⇒
(
j(1−f)− 1
)2
− c
r
= 0 ⇒ j = 1−
√
c/r
1− f
The difference from (3) is the square root term, due to the
presence of two uncoordinated jammers. Compare it, e.g., with
[6], where an analogous result was derived for two uncoor-
dinated agents executing a task. Since c/r ≤ 1, replacing it
with
√
c/r implies a decrease in the jamming probability; both
jammers are aware of each other’s presence in the network and
know they may restrain from intervening if the other is active.
However, this reduced jamming rate is almost negligible if c is
high, which apparently contrasts with immediate intuition. The
explanation is again in the strategic behavior, as both jammers
know that for high transmission cost it is less convenient to be
active, which implies that the other jammer may stay inactive.
With analogous computations, ε at the equilibrium can be
derived. The key is to assume N1 jamming with probability
j, and M entering with probability ε. Applying Theorem 1 to
N2, gives E[uN2(j, 0, ε)] = E[uN2(j, 1, ε)] leading to
−c = f2(1+r)εj + f(1+r)ε− 2f(1+r)εj − ε(1−j)(1+r)
⇒ εj(1+r)(1−f)2 − ε(1+r)(1−f) + c = 0
⇒ ε = c
(1+r)(1−f)(1−j+jf) ⇒ ε =
√
cr
(1+r)(1−f) (6)
after exploiting (5). It is akin to (2) with
√
cr replacing c.
The expected payoff of each jammer E[uN(j, j, ε)] is
ε− jc− c
1−f
(
1− j(1−f)
)2
=
1
1−f
(√
cr
1+r
− c
)
(7)
which, remarkably, is positive if c < r/(1+r)2. This implies
that J2 has a threshold γ for the transmission cost allowing
for a positive expected payoff for the jammers if c < γ. Since
γ = r/(1+r)2, it does not change much for r ∈ [0.5, 2], being
between 2/9 ≈ 0.222 and 0.25. In other words, if transmission
cost c is about 5 times lower than the benefit of successful
jamming, there exists a sustainable profit for the jammers,
over a broad range of values for r. This result is significantly
different from J1; it is also due to the fact that both jammers
get the benefit when M is jammed, even if they are inactive.
Indeed, this “money-for-nothing” gives a better appeal to the
game from the jammer’s standpoint and may hint at desirable
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Fig. 1. Transmission probability ε vs. cost c.
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Fig. 2. Active jamming probability: j in J1, 2j−j
2 in J2; vs. cost c.
design criteria for friendly jamming. However, the width of
transmission cost values that are below threshold γ very much
depends on the jamming failure rate f , since fr < c and (1)
must hold; this means that if f is too high, the problem is
sensible only for values of c that are above threshold.
For visual aid, we report in Fig. 1 the transmission prob-
ability ε of the malicious node and in Fig. 2 the probability
of at least one active jammer (equal to j for J1 and 2j−j2
for J2). The transmission probability of M increases with c,
because the jamming probability decreases; thus, M is jammed
less often, but gets a lower profit r−c in these cases. Node
M is also more aggressive in J2 than in J1. On one hand,
in J2 the probability of being jammed is about the same as
in J1, but the failure rate is lower when both jammers are
active (f2 instead of f ); on the other hand, M can count
on the lack of coordination among the jammers. A bigger
reward r leads to a more frequent jamming in both J1 and J2;
while this discourages the malicious node when facing a single
jammer, in game J2 the opposite happens, and M transmits
more often, relying on the lack of coordination of the jammers.
Remarkably, r has little impact on the transmission probability
ε in J2, since its dependence is through
√
r/(1+ r) that does
not vary much in the considered range, as said before.
Finally, Fig. 3 shows the expected payoff of the jammers,
which is always negative and decreasing in c and r for J1,
while for J2 becomes positive in the narrow region with cost
c below γ = r/(1+r)2, and is impacted little by r.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We formulated a friendly jamming problem in the context of
game theory and we derived closed form solutions for its Nash
equilibrium. We found interesting trends in the transmission
probability of the malicious node as well as the jamming by
the network agents. We further extended the conclusions to
multiple uncoordinated jammers. In this scenario, despite an
increased surveillance, the malicious node tries to transmit
more often, relying on the lack of coordination among the
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Fig. 3. Expected payoff of the friendly jammers vs. cost c.
jammers; however, security is better sustainable since the
expected payoff of the jammers can be positive, as long as
the transmission cost is below a threshold of 0.22–0.25 times
the benefit of successful jamming over a broad range of values.
Some extensions are worth mentioning and currently under
investigation. First, one may evaluate the parameters from a
real application perspective. Moreover, we considered per-
fectly rational strategic players, immediately aware of the
consequences of their actions; yet, within a practical jamming
testbed [3], one may think of experiments to verify whether
human players exhibit (game theoretic) rational behavior.
Finally, the formulation can be expanded. For example,
the illegitimate transmitter may perform channel hopping [2],
discontinued activity, or other sophisticated countermeasures
to avoid being caught [4]. To do so, we can extend the problem
toward dynamic games [9], where the game unfolds over
multiple iterations, or Bayesian games [6], where players have
different types. This goes beyond the scope of the present
analysis, but may be considered in future investigations.
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